Management Services: A Magazine of Planning, Systems, and
Controls
Volume 3

Number 5

Article 4

9-1966

How to Save a Failing Incentive System
Alfred Gelberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtservices
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Gelberg, Alfred (1966) "How to Save a Failing Incentive System," Management Services: A Magazine of
Planning, Systems, and Controls: Vol. 3: No. 5, Article 4.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtservices/vol3/iss5/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Management Services: A Magazine of Planning, Systems, and Controls by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Gelberg: How to Save a Failing Incentive System

A poorly administered or badly out-of-date incentive
plan can often do far more harm than good. This
a case history of a company that had such a plan,
realized and took measures to correct it —

HOW TO SAVE
A FAILING INCENTIVE SYSTEM
by Alfred Gelberg
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery

wage plans, once
viewed as the answer to indus
try’s productivity problems, have
come under attack in recent years.
Many companies are dissatisfied
with the results they have been
getting from them.
Yet the blame, in most cases, be
longs not with the incentive plan
itself but with the way it has been
administered. Wage incentives re
quire continual updating of the
work standards on which they are
based. All too often management
installs a system and then fails to
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monitor it properly, permitting it to
remain static and unimproved while
the organization it was created to
serve is a model of vitality and dy
namic change. Then the system in
evitably deteriorates.

Plans easily outdated
Out-of-date standards and re
ports are typical characteristics of
an incentive plan that has fallen
victim to neglect. As a result, the
plan is likely to generate the very
conditions it was designed to elimi

nate: high costs, distorted wage
patterns, labor discontent, super
visory problems, and managerial in
efficiency.
Even the most seriously deterio
rated plan can be revitalized, how
ever, by a comprehensive updating
program that emphasizes expert in
dustrial engineering and expert
human engineering. This article
describes such an updating pro
gram that was undertaken by a
manufacturing company that pro
duced automobile accessories.
The problems faced by Auto31

1

Management Services: A Magazine of Planning, Systems, and Controls, Vol. 3 [1966], No. 5, Art. 4

In some cases, operators earned more than their supervisors.

krome, Inc.
,
*
illustrate the anatomy
of a failing incentive plan. Man
agement had failed to provide the
staff and funds necessary to main
tain the system. When minor
changes in methods, materials, and
equipment were made, they were
not reflected in new standards.
When new standards were set,
usually for new products, they
were adapted from those for simi
lar old products rather than being
based on new studies.
These loose, outdated standards
tended to become the accepted
reference level for employee earn
ings and to produce pay differen
tials that were not reflected in job
evaluation. Once started in this di
rection, the company found it diffi
cult to pull in the reins and a major
problem to turn back.
Inefficiencies masked

Inflated standards provided cover
for poor supervision and operating
inefficiency since most departments
appeared to be efficient. Conse
quently, little if any make-up pay
or lost time was reported.
*This is a fictitious name although the
s reported are entirely true.
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Acceptance of poor standards re
duced the attention given to proper
training and work methods since
“standards” were being met. More
over, operations that employees, be
cause of loose standards, consid
ered to be “gravy” jobs paradox
ically became the frame of refer
ence for all standards. Distorted
and high earnings became the ac
cepted norm while the concept of
normal or average moved down the
scale. Thus, it became difficult to
regulate wage rates realistically
without creating the impression of
a wage cut.
Best workers penalized

The proficient operator could
make spectacular earnings under
loose standards, but he thereby
risked calling attention to the
poor standard; so he deliberately
restricted his output. The slow and
unskilled operator could earn stan
dard with loose rates despite in
ferior methods or slow pace. Earn
ings in low-grade jobs were often
better than those in high-grade
jobs. In some cases operators
earned more than their supervisors.
These conditions encouraged poor
work habits such as an excessive
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number of visits to the rest room,
late starting and early stopping,
and production-disrupting chatter.
Besides causing cost problems, the
poor incentive system lowered mo
rale. Discontent spread among
operators because they felt they
were not getting their share of
“gravy jobs.”
These were the conditions at
Autokrome when management de
cided to act.
Improvement ground rules

Correction of a malfunctioning
incentive plan must begin with an
analysis of pay versus performance
to identify distortions in earnings.
An audit of standards should fol-
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tions upon which they were based
low to determine which standards
remained unchanged.
are loose and to what degree. It is
also important to determine the
• Changes in conditions would
be followed up promptly with a
amount of time wasted by opera
standards check to avoid a recur
tors since much of the difference
between pay under the new stan
rence of distortions.
• There would be no limitation
dards and pay under the old stan
on what an individual could earn
dards can be made up if lost time
is eliminated and methods are im
by extra skill and/or effort.
• Changes in standards would
proved. Average earnings for com
parable jobs for the industry and
be made gradually, starting with
the area must also be determined
new styles, models, products, meth
so that the new standards can be
ods, and equipment.
pegged to competitive rates.
A policy of moderation is usually
Autokrome’s survey uncovered
well received by employees. The
greater the distortion of standards
the serious malfunctions already
described, including distortions in
uncovered by the preliminary sur
standards of up to 50 per cent. Im
vey, the greater the threat to em
provements were obviously neces
ployees that their earnings will be
sary. It was clear, however, that
reduced by revision of standards—
Autokrome’s biggest problem was
and hence the greater the need for
going to be hostile employee reac
cooperation, instruction, and mod
tion. Changes probably would be
eration in implementation of the
interpreted as a company speedup.
standards improvement program.
Autokrome met this critical chal
lenge by establishing and publiciz
Selling the program
ing fair play policies and practices.
Concentrating on human rela
These included the following guar
tions, Autokrome initiated a series
antees:
of meetings and training sessions

for full and frank evaluation of the
Fair play
company’s problems and its plans
for resolving them. Meetings were
• Standards would not be
held with operators and union
changed so long as all the condi

representatives from various de
partments to explain why the stan
dards were to be changed, how
the changes would be accom
plished, and what effect the changes
would probably have on wages and
operations — and to announce man
agement policy. Technical train
ing sessions in the techniques used
for setting standards were con
ducted for supervisors, union rep
resentatives, and production opera
tors.
Reasons for changes in standards
were explained by presenting thor
ough analyses comparing the meth
ods, materials, and conditions of
old and new standards. These anal
yses showed, for example, where
methods had been simplified to
make the job easier to perform or
where the material had been
changed without accompanying
standards revision. On operations
for which old data were not avail
able, new standards and the studies
on which they were based had to
stand on their own merits.
Both operators and supervisors
started out with the attitude that
the standards upgrading program
was an arbitrary exercise of man
agement power — or a device to
lower wages. As a result of these

Meetings were held with workers to explain how the changes would be made.
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Defective work from previous operators that the worker
had to make good was characteristic of the old system.

training sessions, this early opposi
tion diminished markedly.
Guards against misunderstanding

Whenever it was possible, re
vised standards were introduced
simultaneously with the annual
style, model, and product changes
involving new methods and ma
terials. This left little or no room
for resistance by operators. The
validity
the standards was dem
onstrated by frequent scheduling
of four-to-eight-hour production
studies, each observed by a union
steward. The operators themselves
selected both the person and the
work to be timed, thereby eliminat
ing any grounds for charges that
bias might have been introduced
into the studies. Since the new
standards had been thoroughly
tested before being introduced, the
production studies confirmed that
operators could earn as much as
before without speedups. Calls for
production studies soon diminished
substantially.
Management conceded failures

Management also announced it
would take steps to improve han
dling and scheduling, reduce lost
time, and provide better work aids.
The revised standards pointed up
delays that were management’s re
sponsibility even though an opera

tor could often make up for them
under the old loose standards. The
program uncovered such chronic
irritants as overlong waiting for
work between lots, poor workplace
layouts, shortages of supplies, and
slightly defective work from pre
vious operations that the operator
somehow had to make good. These
conditions were corrected. So were
slovenly work habits ranging from
outright waste of time to awkward
reaches and grasps. The careful at
tention given to proper methods
and training clearly demonstrated
management’s desire that employee
earnings not be reduced.
Results

The Autokrome standards revi
sion program resulted in lower di
rect labor costs and a general im
provement in productivity without
any adverse effect on employees’
earnings. There is no contradiction
here. Under the new program pro
ductivity increased as much as 30
per cent. Because of improvements
in methods, reduction of lost time,
and virtual elimination of wasted
time, workers earned as much as
they had earned under the old
standards.
These
improvements
were
achieved at a cost of three hours
of industrial engineering time for
each one hundred hours of meas
ured labor over a period of one
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year. Since normal maintenance of
an incentive program requires ap
proximately one to two hours of
industrial engineering time per one
hundred hours of measured labor,
the additional expense was negli
gible — particularly in view of the
results. For systems less seriously
deteriorated than Autokrome’s, the
transition period would be sub
stantially shorter and costs corres
pondingly lower.
The introduction of proper stan
dards made it easier to evaluate
supervisory and management per
formance. Loose rates no longer
provided a cover for inefficient
methods, lax controls, low quality,
and poor work flow.
effective in
centive plan thus increases the effi
ciency of both operators and man
agement.
Conclusion

For a standards revision program
to be successful it must be under
stood and approached as a group
effort involving both management
and labor. Every individual who is
affected must be kept informed of
what is going on and given en
couragement. If management treats
all employees fairly and if each
worker is made a participant in and
contributor to the program, an up
dated incentive plan can provide
an outstanding demonstration of in
dustrial democracy at work.
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